

THE GREEN CALDRON

A MAGAZINE OF FRESHMAN WRITING



CONTENTS

<i>Alice W. Thurow: The Suez Canal, a UN Test</i>	1
<i>Avah Louise Phillips: Desegregation in the Schools</i>	2
<i>Dennis Jay Zeitlin: My Theory of Religion</i>	3
<i>Sayre D. Andersen: Conversation Shows the Man</i>	4
<i>Quendred Wutzke Carpenter: What's Wrong— Too Much Diversion?</i>	5
<i>James M. Holden: Nothing to Do But Work</i>	8
<i>Stephen Paul Thomas: National Political Conventions</i>	9
<i>Anonymous: Abecedarians</i>	10
<i>William Field: And Not Mr. Mather's Concept</i>	11
<i>Barbara English: Characters and Characterizations</i>	11
<i>Robert H. Thornberry: The Masterpiece</i>	13
<i>James E. Moore: The Dog Has His Day</i>	15
<i>Gerald I. Silverman: An Afternoon During Fencing Practice</i>	16
<i>Valdmar Heitur: MacArthur Was Caesar, But Truman Was Rome</i>	18

Rhet as Writ

The Suez Canal, a UN Test

ALICE W. THUROW

Rhetoric 102, Theme 1

THE CURRENT CRISIS OVER THE POSSESSION AND USE of the Suez Canal has been of great interest to me. The Canal itself is certainly a very important waterway, of vital concern to every country shipping goods extensively by water. The aspect of the situation which interests me, however, is not the use of the Canal, but the part played in this controversy by the United Nations.

Nasser of Egypt has directly challenged the authority of the English and French. Of much greater importance to the world is the challenge he has made to the authority and ability of the United Nations to settle disputes. Both England and France have labored hard and long to come up with an acceptable solution. The United States has assisted in these labors to a great extent. Dulles has endeavored to maintain a check on France and Great Britain, since the United States does not want an international war started over this issue. Apart from the efforts of several great nations, what part has the United Nations taken in the controversy?

The United Nations was set up at the close of the last World War to maintain peace and arbitrate international disputes. Most of the nations of the world are members of this organization and take an active role in its functions. The Charter of the United Nations outlines the police force it shall maintain and how troops for this police force shall be obtained. This police force has never been organized. Nations can arbitrate at great length through the United Nations, but unless the United Nations has some means of enforcing its decisions, what weight do its dicta carry?

The United Nations is a most necessary and vital agent in international affairs today. It could prove to be the means for maintaining world peace. So far, it has followed too closely the path of the League of Nations. If the United Nations is to be our means of maintaining world peace, then it must have the power to enforce its decisions.

The Suez Canal crisis is much more a test of the strength and determination of the United Nations than it is of the power of Egypt, England, or France. For the sake of the future of the world, I hope the United Nations takes its proper place in the debates upon this crisis. After an acceptable solution is reached, I also hope it is carried out by the United Nations and not by the individual nations concerned.

Desegregation in the Schools

AVAH LOUISE PHILLIPS

Placement Test Theme

SINCE THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN 1955, MUCH HAS been written, said, and done about the integration of the Negro pupil into the white school. Much of the uproar has been political, some has been spiritual, but most has been prejudicial.

Man is a creature of prejudice. Much of this prejudice is a manifestation of his inborn egotism. *His* religion is the right one, *his* color is the superior one, *his* politics are the soundest. This prejudice is right and good to a certain extent. Man should be proud of his beliefs; he should be proud of his race; he should be proud of his political affiliations. However, when this pride mushrooms into such proportions as to exclude respect for another man of different beliefs, it is no longer righteous pride, but selfish, simple prejudice.

It is this same prejudice which has created the furor about integration. This prejudice has no place in the modern, democratic United States. In Clinton, Tennessee, and in Mayfield, Texas, Negroes were forcibly excluded from white schools. Is this true democracy? Is this a portrayal of our belief that all men are created equal?

The Negro has always been in disfavor in all the United States, although particularly so in the South, where the first slaves were brought in the seventeenth century. In touring the South, one may see this disfavor exemplified in the tiny, filthy, dilapidated shacks which many Negroes call home. This disfavor may be seen exemplified in the North by the exclusion of the Negro from certain residential districts, or from expensive theaters and restaurants.

One characteristic of this prejudice-flavored discrimination, however, cannot be ignored. That is, children are not naturally prejudiced toward other children. All youngsters have the same innate pride in themselves and their accomplishments as do adults, but they do not create barriers of color, religion, or race, as do adults.

It is this ingenuous acceptance of others which children have that may determine the future of the integration principle. Adults would do well to be led by their children in the problem of segregation. In his exposition, *The Human Mind*, Karl Menninger states: "Only in the minds of idiots and small children can there be found an artless, true conscience."

Although American adults are neither idiots nor small children, they should also have artless, true consciences. If this inner spirit can be invoked, the problem of integration in schools will be solved, and the American nation can again lift its head in liberty.

My Theory of Religion

DENNIS JAY ZEITLIN

Placement Test Theme

PROLOGUE: The moon gazed down upon the forest, partially illuminating the clearing, the sacrificial altar, and the huddled men gazing back in a totality of fear and reverence . . .

BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO LAUNCH INTO "MY THEORY OF Religion" I would like to make a few explanations. First of all, I am aware that my ideas do not represent the general sentiment of the American people, and I hope that the reader will not take offense at any of the opinions expressed here. Perhaps a brief look at my past will indicate the origin of these opinions.

I come from a family of Jewish background, although neither my mother nor my father feel strongly about any religion. They have never forced me to go to synagogue, but also they were perfectly willing to let me attend services during a period of extreme social pressure by my friends. My father is a doctor; my mother is a speech pathologist. Basically, then, our house is one of science. But enough of my history—let us go back further into the past, not my past, but back to the early days of the human species.

When man first appeared on this earth thousands of years ago, he was not, if what most scientists say is true, greatly in advance culturally of his fellow animals. In the early stages of his existence he was possessed of little or no technology. And yet he was confronted with all the geological upheavals and cosmic phenomena that we are confronted with today. Because of his cultural and technological immaturity, his environment must have necessarily seemed far more awe-inspiring than does ours today. However, man cannot be happy when he does not know, and he worries about this lack of knowledge. He becomes insecure, a condition which would seem to be in exact opposition to the homeostasis that scientists say all men strive for. It appears then that man's happiness depended upon facing and "solving" the unknown. Ancient men did this in the only way that they could. They affixed the mantles of gods upon the great bodies and events which they observed in nature: the sun, moon, trees, rain, and all the others which they could not explain. Life, death and sickness were also probably conceived as deities. This was how they "explained" their milieu and "faced" the unknown: through reverence and fear of gods.

But since that time, man has most certainly progressed culturally and technologically. We have discovered fire, steel, coal. We can build huge buildings and cities, and now even contemplate a structure one mile high. We have virtually conquered smallpox, malaria, bubonic plague, and possibly in the near future, polio. We can swim faster than any fish, we can fly faster

than any bird, we can run faster than any animal, all with the aid of our environment-conquering devices. Man has certainly progressed in his battle against his milieu. Has his method of facing the unknown also progressed?

Many of the so-called modern religions, which ostensibly have derived from the past, still preach the fear and reverence of a god, a god that controls or oversees the actions of humans, predestines them, designates them to a heaven or a hell after death, but an entity that will certainly have pity and kindness for those who prostrate themselves before him. A few of these "modern" religions persist in denying the use of the tremendous advances in medicine, preferring to leave their members malformed or, in some cases, to die.

I do not pretend to have the authority to condemn these people, nor do I feel that anyone has this right. There are definitely advantages to a complete faith in a religion. People possessing such faith can face the unknown and their problems with an amazing degree of fatalism and serenity, employing the admittedly comforting crutch of God. However, I do not believe that this is the logical way to behave in a supposedly scientific society. I would classify myself as an agnostic—I do not claim or disclaim the existence of a god. But since no one has been able to teach me to perceive "God" with any of the senses, which are the bases of the scientific method, I prefer to live my life assuming that such things as life after death, predestination, and reincarnation do not exist. I believe that the logical way to face the unknown is with the scientific method—employing all the senses, reason, and experimentation. I believe that in this never-ending quest for knowledge, gleaned in a realistic, logical way, man can come and actually has come farther along the road toward his goal of a security based on a true and firm foundation.

EPILOGUE: The moon gazed down upon the earth, illuminating a section of the huge, 200-inch telescope staring silently back at it . . .

Conversation Shows the Man

SAYRE D. ANDERSEN

Rhetoric 102, Theme 3

THERE ARE MANY METHODS THAT MEN EMPLOY TO judge their fellow men; some people use the criterion of dress, others go by physical appearances, and others form opinions just from first impressions. But the most valid standard is that of an individual's conversation—what he says and how he says it. The two aspects must be carefully considered if a person wishes to evaluate another by his speech.

Conversation is the table of contents of a man's intelligence. What an individual talks about is directly related to the amount of knowledge he

possesses. It is apparent that a person who ends his education with high school cannot speak as intelligently and on as wide a variety of subjects as can a college graduate. For example, a person who continually talks about himself and his own experiences is considered conceited; in many cases, however, it is a lack of education, not conceit, that has limited his sphere of interest and understanding. Conversely, the man who has a profundity of knowledge in only one field is easily identified by the want of scope in his conversation. But the evaluation of a man's learning is not the sole information to be gained from his speech; examination of the opinions, the prejudices, and the desires expressed in his conversation can be resolved into a reasonably just estimate of the quality of his moral character.

But manner is as important as matter. The ability or inability of a person to express himself clearly, concisely, and forcefully determines the impression he will make upon others. The man who is adept at conveying his thoughts to others with simplicity gains respect, confidence, and admiration. Very true is the assertion that those who have nothing to say usually say the most. Instead of creating an impression of great intelligence, verbosity shows a lack of thinking and reveals an obviously falsified erudition. In the same manner, vagueness and obscurity in speech point out a person's ignorance. Thus the keys to manner are conciseness, force, and sincerity.

Conversational ability—what is said and how it is said—is one of the most accurate means by which a man can be evaluated. Quite wisely did the Greek orator Demosthenes say: "A vessel is known by the sound, whether it be cracked or not; so men are proved, by their speech, whether they be wise or foolish."

What's Wrong—Too Much Diversion?

QUENDRED WUTZKE CARPENTER

Rhetoric 102, Theme 11

ONE DAY LAST SUMMER I HAPPENED UPON A FORMER classmate of mine who had left high school to get married. After the usual animated greeting between long-separated friends, I noticed that her face had an anonymous, mask-like appearance. Her momentary brightness had been quickly replaced by a rather dull, vacant look—one that I had seen many times before on the faces of married women. I asked her how she was getting along. "Oh fine—fine," she said, as though by reflex. I went ahead to tell her some local news, and, pausing for a reply, I received an empty-sounding, "Oh?" I said a few more words to her, but I lost interest

in continuing when it suddenly occurred to me that, though she was looking at me and smiling, she wasn't *listening* to me at all. As she walked away, I couldn't help thinking that in a world that must be, in hundreds of ways, more interesting than it ever has been before, among a people who have more free time than has ever been known, with so many interesting things to do, she was somehow missing out. I could imagine her rapidly becoming a typical "housewife."

Although something seems to be wrong with her and others like her, it is certainly not in the fact that they have gotten married. Married women hold positions of enviable importance. One of the most influential members—perhaps *the* most influential member of our society is the homemaker. Her job is to make complete the lives of all other people, young and old, in every other sort of occupation. Not only does she fulfil the physical needs of her charges by seeing to it that they are well fed and clothed and can relax in clean, pleasant surroundings, but she is the catalytic agent in uniting each family member, with his own separate environment and concerns, into one loyal unit, and she serves as intermediary to interpret to her family the affairs of the community. She sets the standard for her family; thus collectively the standard for the neighborhood is set. Her babies copy the vocabulary she uses and the way she talks. They summarily adopt her basic outlook on life; her opinions expressed become immediately their own. Her living habits, her ethics, her tastes, and her mental awareness are the patterns that inevitably shape the characters of everyone in her family. When it comes to developing people who can set the pace in our society, the homemaker has a direct control.

How many "pace setters" are there, though, in this world—in our neighborhoods? Most of the public are content to follow. They're satisfied to remain common, even uninteresting (and often *uninterested*), and to somehow just manage to keep pace—however, if keeping pace means knowing who one's alderman is and voting in every election, a tremendous number of citizens are not even keeping pace with their world. But then, how many homemakers are setting a good pace for their families? The fault doesn't lie in the role they play, but in the fact that something prevents many of them from doing justice to the part. Their influence is just as great as that of any homemaker, but they are not really worthy of the name "homemaker" at all. It is these women I prefer to label as "housewives."

A multitude of young women have as their primary goal in life, marriage, and, having attained it, everything that follows belongs in the "happily-ever-after" category, the real acting out of which creates an anticlimax. Unaware of the possibilities for excitement in their lives, they seek instead some artificial stimulation. This is easy—all too easy for their own good. Modern communication, one of the marks of our great progress, steps in to make "housewives" out of them. Absorbing this constant flow of communication leaves a woman little time—or need—to think on her own. The creative ideas of other people are at her fingertips in countless magazines. Manufacturers of household goods taunt her into feeling obligated to lose herself in house-

work, vying with the woman next door through the "magic" of commercial products. She glances hurriedly through the newspaper to read of local scandal—and if there is time, the Hollywood column. Her only conversational ability lies in the realm of gossip. Day long, her radio (if not her television) suspends her in the fantasy-world of the soap opera—the tear-jerking serial story to which countless women become addicted. From every side, the commercial world, through a vast, varied system of communication, seeks to outdo itself in providing material that will awaken her interests, but only enough to make her go shopping. It isn't possible for her to take it all in. Such an unceasing harangue is sufficient cause to make a woman, in self defense, habitually heed only a fraction of the noise and print that comes her way. She notices little—becomes a poor listener. The only things which will succeed in catching her attention are the extraordinary, the exaggerated, the odious and the glamorous, or threats to her feeling of security. She, whose influence is so great, is thus herself influenced by such harmful means.

Actually, what holds true for the "housewife" holds true for anyone constantly exposed to the all-powerful influence of commercial communication. Let's consider ourselves. For many years we have been pupils in school. Our days have been spent in exposure to the wonders of the world through the lectures and class discussions in which our teachers talk themselves hoarse, the increasingly popular visual-aid movies, and the textbooks in which we do regularly assigned reading. We must assimilate as much as possible of the torrent of ideas that surrounds us, not merely to keep from becoming dull, passive social bores, but in order that we may develop into competent, useful citizens of our communities, contributing our best to the society in which we live. Yet our elders are becoming uncomfortably aware of the fact that we, too, have allowed our senses to become dulled by the devices used by our mass media of communication. They sigh to admit that students would grasp more information from their science textbooks were they written in the sensational, brightly illustrated form of the comic books children clamor to buy. They realize that more pupils would at least be able to remember *having seen* their classroom movies were the diagrams narrated by lively cartoon characters, and a touch of Hollywood-type romance slipped into each geography class travelog. In the spirit of "if you can't fight 'em—join 'em," our teachers find themselves tempted to ape radio and television commercials; they consume class hours in repeating the same material over and over far more than should be necessary, in hopes that, at some fleeting moment during this time, each youngster might condescend to listen. Like the "housewife" who slips into a boring rut, we are forgetting what it's like to approach life with awareness and curiosity—we have all been pampered into requiring information to beat its way into our consciousness, so that we may respond with an expressionless "Oh?"

Learning is changing one's mind.

—Ronald Richards

Nothing to Do but Work

JAMES M. HOLDEN

Rhetoric 102, Theme 3

THE POOR, UNSUSPECTING STUDENT WHO CHOOSES TO study electrical engineering at the University of Illinois will find that his school work will occupy all his time. He will not have a free or leisure minute to call his own. While I speak from personal experience for the communication option students, I know of students who are taking the other options, power or illumination, and their predicament is the same. The average student will find that this is the case. Naturally, the brilliant man will have some leisure time; but the slower one will be fortunate to find time to sleep and eat.

There is no argument against the fact that any person, regardless of his occupation, requires a certain amount of diversion and recreation. This is especially true for a student, because his school work demands intense mental concentration. The scholar needs leisure time to release these tensions built up in the class rooms and study halls. This is a recognized fact. Unfortunately, here at the University of Illinois the student does not have the time to relax. Why?

This situation is the result of two main causes. First, the semester-hour credit granted for most electrical engineering courses is unrealistic. Second, the Electrical Engineering School is overcrowded with students and understaffed with instructors. Both of these conditions result in the student spending more time with his books than he normally would have to.

Most electrical engineering courses are under-rated, in that they require more time by the student than he is reimbursed for in semester hours. EE 322, Circuit Analysis, is an excellent example of this inequality. This course meets five days a week for one hour of instruction each time, and it also requires ten to fifteen hours of home-work a week. All this time and work is rewarded with four semester hours. Laboratory courses are either given as a one-hour course or attached to a four-hour course without any extra credit. EE 323, Circuit Analysis Laboratory, is a one-hour course. It takes, however, three hours of class work and four to six hours of homework each week. This whole problem may be boiled down to a simple summary. The electrical engineering curriculum is a five-year course squeezed into four years. This, coupled with reason number two, requires that the student work harder and longer than those in other colleges.

In order to take care of the increased enrollment, the electrical engineering department has streamlined its instruction. Individual teaching has given way to mass lecture, and evaluation has been reduced to tabulating the results of hour exams and homework assignments. Even the laboratory has

lost its individual touch. Four, five or more students are crowded around one small table. The laboratory report determines the grade.

In order to pass these courses, a great number of hours must be spent on preparing the written reports and problem solutions. These papers are the primary factor in the final grade. Because of the mass-production methods of teaching, the student must also spend more time studying on his own. It is impossible to estimate how much this second situation increases the student's work load, but it does require considerably more work than normally should be required. Because of the above two reasons, an electrical engineering student will be working almost twenty-hour hours a day.

The simple solution to this problem is to expand the electrical engineering curriculum to five years, double the size of the electrical engineering building, and hire one hundred more instructors. Naturally, this is impossible. Just the same, however, the student needs a little time to relax and rest. What can be done? Both the student and instructor must recognize the problem. The instructor must be reasonable and understanding. A close coordination between instructors must be maintained to eliminate duplication and to synchronize test and homework assignments. Finally, the Electrical Engineering Department must continually work on the problem and remember that each student is, after all, a human being and needs time to eat, sleep, and have a little diversion.

National Political Conventions

STEPHEN PAUL THOMAS

Placement Test Theme

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, FRENCH POLITICAL SCIENTIST of the nineteenth century, demonstrated that the element of confusion was a necessary part of democratic government. However, when confusion approaches chaotic proportions, the time for remedial and reconstructive measures is at hand. It would appear that now is the time for some changes in our methods of selecting nominees for the offices of President and Vice-President of the United States.

The practice of holding national political conventions was begun in the 1800's by a small, now no longer extant political party. Practically every governmental practice and policy has, since that era, been revised. Yet in one hundred years we have not altered our methods of selecting nominees for the two most important jobs in America. If this practice had always proven itself efficient, there would be no need for change. But out of national political conventions have come nominees who were not qualified, not particularly desirous of being elected, and not physically able to handle the highest governmental positions.

Recently some one hundred million Americans watched all or a large part of two national political conventions. The viewing multitudes did not hear officially from any of the prospective candidates until after the nominations were complete. It seems to me that a much more efficient system would be for the prospective candidates to present their cases to the American people, via the vast communication systems we have. After the American people had heard from and seen all the candidates, a national primary election could be held. In this manner the people would choose their candidates directly.

It seems to me that this system would be, not a dangerous change, but a necessary modification. The ultimate worth of any democratic process, I am told, is proportional to the worth of the individuals taking part in it.

Abecedarians

ANONYMOUS

Rhetoric 101, Theme 2

THE FACT THAT A TEACHER IS A HUMAN BEING IS POSSIBLY the one and only declaration about him that remains truthful and steadfast under the duresses of time and among many leagues of disheartened scholars. An instructor is also that individual who is faced with the momentous task of fashioning, casting, and influencing the lives of his most worthy but unwittingly thick-headed pupils.

To the scholar, the instructor is that unnecessary, undefined, inhumanly shaped, unimaginably cruel monster who is the root of all a pupil's worries. An instructor is that shouting and disheveled personage whose only purpose in life is to produce a cringing, frustrated, and thoroughly cowed individual. The mentor is that mass of humanity who springs unannounced quizzes on the totally unprepared student. The mentor's sole distorted reason for these unannounced quizzes is the solitary pleasure of seeing his pupils squirm, perspire, and go through the various acrobatic contortions usually associated with examinations. An instructor also spends all of his waking hours, and almost all of the hours of the night, in contriving the most hideously impossible-to-complete-in-the-time-allotted homework assignments and examinations.

To the more learned and unbiased, a mentor is an amateur psychiatrist, philanthropist, philosophizer, and fortune-teller. An instructor also has the quick wit and humor of a professional comedian, the literary and journalistic talents of an author, the corrective and disciplinary attributes of a prison warden, the understanding and patience of a parent, the didactic temperament of a clergyman, and the sense of fairness and honesty of a judge.

Beneath all the outwardly atrocious traits of a mentor, there lies a most subtle, serene, patient, intelligent, and persuasive personality. This complex personality is trying to accomplish one of the most difficult undertakings of this or any other age. The abecedarian is laboring to educate the uneducated.

And Not Mr. Mather's Concept

WILLIAM FIELD

Rhetoric 101, Theme 6

SEX EDUCATION IN OUR SCHOOLS IS, IN MY OPINION, A sadly neglected subject. Even in the schools in which it is a compulsory subject, it is taught in such a puritanical manner as to become almost worthless.

The course is usually given on a strictly hygienic basis. Some of the physiological functions of the reproductive system are presented in the driest manner possible, and such points as birth control and venereal disease are very lightly touched upon and then immediately dropped by the instructors, who, for the most part, are extremely leery of head-on clashes with the students' religious indoctrinations.

Not only should the student be given a survey course in the physiological nature of the sex act and reproduction, but he should be enlightened as to the morality of the thoughts and feelings he will experience (or already has) in relation to sex.

The taboos against any but a certain few sex habits should be explained by someone with some knowledge of anthropology and psychology. Some effort should be made to dispel the misconceptions about morality and Godliness in the sex act, which have been drilled into the average student by his church and various other organizations—for example, the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts. I can see no valid reason for letting people go through life with the distorted idea that there are only one or two "Godly" ways to have sexual relations, and that it must be done in the dark at all costs.

If we are going to have sex education at all, and it is desperately needed, let us have a sound and complete education in all phases of the subject, instead of the slipshod, puerile courses now presented.

Characters and Characterizations

BARBARA ENGLISH

Rhetoric 102, Theme 13

IN SOME RESPECTS *CRIME AND PUNISHMENT* READS LIKE a murder mystery. Usually in such a story, however, a reason exists for the crime. In *Crime and Punishment* we never really know, nor does Raskolnikov, why Alyona Ivanovna was murdered. Raskolnikov, our hero

who is not always heroic, is a confused "former student" who is searching to find himself. He is an uncommon person who fights society and its established social patterns, dreams big dreams, and makes big plans. He fails, however, when making his plans, to consider life as a whole; or if he does, he overlooks the relative importance of the parts. Two theories are offered for the pawnbroker's death. The first suggested is that Raskolnikov plans to use the money he would have access to after the murder to continue his education, to care for his mother and sister, and to make it possible to accomplish great acts of charity in recompense for his crime. The other theory is that Raskolnikov considers himself a potential Napoleon and thinks by committing the murder to convince the world and himself that he is a great man. He expects to become great, not in spite of his crime, but because of it.

In writing that is far more than melodrama, Dostoyevski's characters are made so vitally alive that the reader knows them better than he knows many of his living friends. Every emotion is shared. Dostoyevski's characters always react and act in extremes. They do not merely speak when they wish to say something; they roar, snap, shout, sigh, whisper, mutter, storm, rant, shudder, demand, implore, shriek, command. Dostoyevski's characters share their insights into each others' thoughts and emotions. They are shockingly forward in expressing their true thoughts and feelings. If they were to come to life, perhaps we would find them all crude, blunt, stark, and offensive. W. Somerset Maugham goes so far as to say: "They are strangely lacking in the normal attributes of human beings. They have only passions. They have neither self-control nor self-respect."¹

Another of Fyodor Dostoyevski's greatest novels, *The Brothers Karamazov*, is now in the process of being filmed. I am, of course, extremely anxious to see the movie, and yet, I wonder how successful, from an artistic and interpretive standpoint, such a production will be. Dostoyevski, it seems to me, is not a playwright but a novelist; his works are not written to be acted but to be read; his characters are not made to be created by a group of human beings intent on reproducing the story but within human beings reading the novel.

To me the most impressive talent of Dostoyevski is not his skill in plot development but his ability to create and handle characters. When the reader, along with the character, senses every nervous twitch, feels every emotional response, shares every thought, he cannot help becoming intrinsically involved in the story. There are no uninteresting characters in Dostoyevski's *Crime and Punishment*. All are vividly portrayed and carefully examined. The author's analyses are almost frightening. Dostoyevski knows his characters far better than many people know themselves, and he shares this creator's insight with his reader. It is, in fact, shocking to see occasionally a glimpse of yourself in one of Dostoyevski's characters.

¹ *The Art of Fiction* (Doubleday and Company, New York, 1955), p. 265.

The Masterpiece

ROBERT THORNBERRY

Rhetoric 102, Theme 10

THE SOUND AND THE FURY IS A LITERARY MASTER-piece, created by William Faulkner. Imagination and realism abound in his compelling story of an old southern family. Detailed description molds the complete environment of Jefferson, Mississippi, and pictures a doomed student's last day in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Time, however, is undefinable in this story, for the narration is primarily related in the minds of three characters—Benjamin, the idiot; Quentin, the destined son; and Jason, the Mother's choice. Names, actions, sounds, smells—all suddenly cause the minds of these actors to remember childhood days, character-molding moments, and a free, wonderful existence. Thus, memory is merged with reality, and the reader is often confused; for the real mind does not punctuate its fleeting thoughts, or use apostrophes to distinguish possessions, or capitalize names. All is an intangible dream, vivid with life-giving memory. The moment, an insignificant second of June 6, 1928, becomes a winter evening in 1898 or a spring morning in 1911. The reader is helplessly lost if he does not live the life of each narrator and allow his mind to grasp the recurrences.

The Sound and the Fury has today a unique sequel. Mr. Faulkner has recently written an appendix to serve as a foreword and supplement to this novel published in 1929. The result of his venture adds much interest to the story; for the appendix is a character study including the founders of the Compson family in America, their descendants, and finally the main actors of the novel. In result, the reader obtains an understanding of this miscellaneous family, views its characterization, learns the fates of its members, and sees the fragments of wasted lives slowly ruin and lapse into extermination.

The book itself is divided into four sections, representing four days—each, however, a multiple of many days. The first three days are seen through the eyes and minds of Benjy, Quentin, and Jason, respectively. The fourth day, however, is narrated by the author. In this sequence the reader views the final facet of the story from the outside and is thus able to piece the accumulated fragments together and witness the inevitable end.

The first section is lived in Benjy, the idiot. Deaf and dumb, this human being cannot react to words, but he can comprehend them. Moreover, his ability to see and smell is penetrating, and he can remember with profound vividness when his mind is jarred by stimuli. "Moaning and slabbering," he spends his days wandering aimlessly about, always hearing, "Hush, hush . . . , Hush now." He is pacified only by the three things that he loves: "the pasture which was sold to pay for Candace's wedding and to send Quentin to Harvard, his sister Candace [who smells like leaves and then like trees], firelight." When only the firelight in the kitchen stove is left, he loves the remnants, an occasional flower and a white satin shoe. Benjy is superbly

portrayed and never strays from his role. Mr. Faulkner describes him, thirty-three years old, as "a big man who appeared to have been shaped of some substance whose particles would not or did not cohere to one another or to the frame which supported it. His skin was dead looking and hairless; dropsical too, he moved with a shambling gait like a trained bear. His hair was pale and fine. It had been brushed smoothly down upon his brow like that of children in daguerrotypes. His eyes were clear, of the pale sweet blue of cornflowers, his thick mouth hung open, drooling a little."

Quentin, Benjy's brother, assumes the role of story-teller in the second section and, consequently, reverts the story to the day when he committed suicide. In Quentin, the reader lives a doomed life, for Quentin is possessed with his shadow and with time. He needs no mirror to see his passing frame; his shadow, always with him, shows a black image and leads him to the river where it places him, "twinkling and glinting, like breathing," upon the cold water, even though he stands secure on the bridge with the sun warming his shoulders. Time ticks continuously for this individual, and thus he cannot live; he remembers his father's words, "... time is dead as long as it is being clicked off by little wheels; only when the clock stops does time come to life." Quentin knows that he is to die; he feels love for his sister Caddy, yet she is married. He remembers his incest with her and knows the loss of honor. Moreover, "the remaining piece of the old Compson mile," the inheritance, the pasture which Benjy loved, was sold in order that he might spend a useless year at Harvard ... had he deserved it?

William Faulkner sculpts a third character, Jason, to live the third section. The "last sane male" of the Compson family, he is his mother's favorite, for he is a Bascomb—one of her people. Thus, Jason is separate, lonely; he develops into a pseudo-man, possessed by money and arrogance. His stature is a cast-iron puppet of evil whose strength is easily broken when his fatherless niece robs him of his hoarded treasure. Lifeless, beaten at his own thievery, he can but sit quietly "with his invisible life ravelled out about him like a wornout sock."

Throughout these sections and the last one, the reader meets other characters, some white, some black, and explores more of Mr. Faulkner's creativeness. He is introduced to the Mother, whose interminable tears and utterances, "It's all my fault," portrays the judgment of her children, and then to the Negro mammy, Dilsey, who speaks the final note, "I seed de beginnin, en now I sees de endin." Indeed, Dilsey does behold the last generation of the once-great family. The Compsons had flowered long ago; a governor and a general had ruled the once-splendid home. She sees that flower wither and cast its seeds on barren soil; she knows "the weed-choked traces of the old ruined lawns and promenades ... the scaling columns of the portico. ..."

Decay grasps the Compson family while change invades their estate. As dignity and honor are lost, the fields are lost, and eventually the house, too. A golf course spreads across the pasture, and the mansion becomes a boarding-house. All vanishes with change, but the old square mile becomes "intact again in row after row of small crowded jerrybuilt individually owned demiurban bungalows."

The Dog Has His Day

JAMES E. MOORE

Rhetoric E 102, Theme 8

LAST SUNDAY WAS OFFICIALLY DESIGNATED AS THE first annual Dogs' Day by the World Order of Knights-Champions of the Domestic Dog. The Knights decided that Mothers, Fathers, and the like had monopolized the Sabbatical holidays long enough. Observance of the holiday was marred only by a few reports of heretical activity but in most quarters the observance was considered a great success.

Many individuals and organizations aligned themselves with the World Order to support Dogs' Day. In the nation's capital the Chief Executive presented a puppy to his youngest grandson before television and movie cameras. Dog pounds throughout the nation were dispensing little bundles of joy at request. From his headquarters at Indianapolis the American Legion National Commander keynoted a drive for an All-American Dog. The commander went on to say that dogs as well as humans must stand ready to prove their loyalty. He called for a national committee to investigate subversive activity among the Army's Canine Corps. In Philadelphia, Wanamaker's First Annual Dogs' Day Parade got off to an ominous start as the parade marshal had difficulty aligning the participants. As the parade progressed, the blue bloods were heckled at every turn by their street and alley cousins. The procession was, in the words of the *Philadelphia Bulletin*, "A succession of catastrophies caused by the all-too-lively participation of the lower classes." The parade completely fell apart when the capricious canines invaded a 54th street butcher shop. Police used fire hoses to disperse the crowd. No plans have been announced for a parade next year. A more happy note was added by the American Medical Association when they stated that no fatalities due to rabies were reported on Dogs' Day. Lions International dismissed a motion to change their name to one more canine.

The holiday was formally observed by many churches throughout the world. The Amalgamated Society of Undenominational Ministers pledged sermons and prayers glorifying man's best friend. At Catholic churches the world over, puppies large and small were brought forth to the baptismal fonts by children to receive the official sanctification of the church. In Rome, Pope Pius XIII decreed a special church holiday and granted audiences to greats of the canine world. Highlight of the Vatican week was the audience of Donnegal Highland Rodney My Own True Rover VI, grand champion Irish setter. Rover VI received the pontifical sprinkling as a true champion and noble animal—without shaking off the water. In the United States religious services lauded canines from coast to coast. From pulpits ecclesiastical dignitaries expounded on the dignity of dog and the beautiful relationship that exists between him and man. The national chairman of the Women's Chris-

tian Temperance Union pointed out dogs as an example of clean living and abstinence from intoxicating liquids. *The Sufferer*, official publication of the Christian Scientists, used the holiday as an opportunity to lambaste veterinarians for their unscrupulous efforts to prolong animal suffering. Most churches devoted a portion of Sunday's services to saluting the dog.

Dogs' Day was well received by the business world. The National Biscuit Company announced that dog biscuit sales were at an all-time high and that a twenty-five percent increase over the previous yearly high is expected. Canned dog food sales were up. Reports were equally good from retailers. Many stores were sold out of leather collars as the holiday approached. Sales of rubber balls, flea soap, and associated articles were high. Some grumblings were heard from catnip producers, but it is rumored that they are planning their own holiday later this year. The American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation is planning to have an all-aluminum air-conditioned doghouse on the market by the next holiday. The feeling of the business world is perhaps best summed up by the quotation of John Ellingsworth McClasky III, manager of Saks-Fifth Avenue Dog Shop. Mr. McClasky said, "As far as we're concerned, nothing is too good for the sons of bitches."

Happy children and smiling adults alike enjoyed the holiday. From all indications Dogs' Day was well received by the public and is well on its way to becoming an American institution.

An Afternoon During Fencing Practice

GERALD SILVERMAN

Rhetoric 101, Theme 1

EVERY DAY, I PRACTICE FENCING WITH THE VARSITY team at the Men's Old Gym. During the course of these sessions, many surprising and belittling events happen to me. Let me describe a typical afternoon.

Before starting practice, I exercise. First, I do sit-ups. Feeling quite athletic, I also do knee-bends, leg-stretches, and toe-touches—all in rapid succession. I am ready to begin. I stand before the full-length mirror, get into position, and lunge. My knee buckles and I collapse. After exercising like that, why shouldn't I fall? I'm not Superman!

After sufficient rest, I practice my lunges. Satisfied with my lunging form, I advance to the *parry*, *riposte*, *ballaestra*, and other, more intricate maneuvers.

After a half-hour, I feel ready to exhibit my skills to Coach Garret. I stand before him, assuming the much practiced *guard* position. I feel a sharp pain as my sabre falls from my hand. "Your wrist was turned a quarter of an inch too much, Silverman. Try it again!" I try it again. My knee begins bleeding as the coach slashes me. "Keep your knee over your toe! Try it again!" I try it again. There! My position is perfect, and there is no cause for complaint. "Okay Silverman, beat, lunge, cut head!" I beat, lunge, and find myself on the floor, my shoulder and chest throbbing in pain. "Silverman! You extend your arm and *then* you lunge. Try it again . . . Good!" I am overjoyed. My long sessions of practice have paid off. The coach tells me to do it once more. I beat, extend my arm, lunge, cut head, and feel a sharp pain across my upper arm. "You bent your elbow too far, Silverman!"

This torture continues until the coach is disgusted and banishes me to the mirror. I leave his presence, followed by a furious stream of curses directed not only at me, but at freshmen in general.

I practice again. I practice my parries until my arms hurt, and then I practice lunging. I practice *ballaestras* and *disengages*. I practice everything I know. Then, I ask a varsity member to check me on these various manipulations. He looks and finds nothing wrong. I properly execute everything. I am ready to face the coach again.

"On guard," says Garret. Immediately after assuming the position, I look at my hand to count my fingers. "How many times must I tell you," he shouts, "that your thumb must be even with your arm? Now, ballaestra, lunge, and cut flank!" As I extend my arm, the coach's sabre slices across my chest. Must I go on? This routine goes on every day.

I head for the nearest corner and sit down. I remove my mask and wipe the perspiration from my face. Wringing out the towel, I exchange my sabre for a foil. With the foil, I practice motions that are positively tabu in sabre. Naturally, I confuse the two styles.

A friend asks me to fence with him. I consent. We face each other. I glance toward Garret, and I see him looking at me. I remember the session we just had, and my hands begin trembling. My nervousness and my confusion of the two types of weapons cause me to make common, unforgivable errors. Entirely flustered, I lose my balance while lunging, and fall.

I decide, then and there, that I am through for the day. I slouch dejectedly into the locker room and prepare to shower. The thought of hot water caressing my tired body lifts my spirits to the highest level. I turn the handle and a stream of ice-cold water cascades over me. I shall refrain from describing the ensuing remarks.

In an entirely sour mood, I dress myself and limp home.

MacArthur Was Caesar, but Truman Was Rome

VALDMAR HEITUR

Rhetoric 102, Theme 7

"GENERAL MACARTHUR'S PLACE IN HISTORY," THE President of the United States told the country and the world in the early morning hours of April 11, 1951, as he announced the relief of General Douglas MacArthur of his several commands in the Far East, "is fully established." This statement was to start the great controversy that shook the nation in the spring and summer of 1951.¹

The MacArthur controversy was many things: it was the investigation conducted by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees; it was the debate in the regular sessions of the House and Senate; it was thousands of newspaper editorials; it was Henry Luce bugling a "Tattoo for a Warrior" in *Life*; it was Broadway turning a fast buck with recordings of "Old Soldiers Never Die"; it was General Eisenhower in Paris saying he hoped there wouldn't be any controversy; it was Winston Churchill paying his respects to MacArthur—"that great soldier and great statesman"—and advising Europe to be discreet, which in general it was; it was Senator Wherry asking the public to compare the "monumental record of General MacArthur with that of his accusers—with the record of moral decay, greed, corruption, and confusion"; it was Norman Thomas saying that "if MacArthur had his way not one Asian would have believed the United States had civilian government"; it was the burning in effigy of the President and the telegrams demanding impeachment; it was the Seattle drinker shoving his companion's head in a bucket of beer and three senators exchanging oaths and laborious blows outside a Washington radio station.²

The center of the controversy, of course, was the investigation conducted by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. A total of 2,045,000 words were spoken and transcribed in the Senate Office Building during the investigation that lasted from May 3, 1951, to June 25, 1951.³

At some point during the Korean conflict General MacArthur must have embarked on a course of provocation of the government. This may have begun after his trip to Formosa, and by December of 1950, the dissensions between the President and the General * had become numerous. General Mac-

¹ Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The General and the President, and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1951), p. 13.

² *Ibid.*, p. 176.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 176-177.

* The term "General" will be used throughout this paper as meaning General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

Arthur was apparently convinced that the government was on a disastrous course in the Far East and that it was his duty to focus attention upon the fallacies and to bring about a change.⁴ Generally speaking, the General made three basic challenges of the American policy in Asia: he challenged the policy (or non-policy as he would have it) in Korea; he challenged the policy in China; and he challenged the strategy in which Korea and China had subordinate parts.⁵ Some sort of argument was inevitable between the President and General MacArthur. "As Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon said, two voices had arisen on American foreign policy, 'that of General MacArthur and that of the President of the United States.'" This dissonance was resolved when the President "... took upon himself the enormous responsibility of relieving General of the Army Douglas MacArthur."⁶ "Truman was Rome; MacArthur Caesar."⁷

At 8:00 p.m. on June 24, 1950, the State Department received news that the armies of the People's Republic of North Korea had invaded the Republic of Korea. General MacArthur's views and opinions were not sought by the President when he directed the preparation of the statement to intervene in the Korean fighting to stop aggression. The statement was issued in the late evening of June 26, 1950. The President's decision was to use certain elements of the Navy and Air Force in support of the Republic of Korea forces. On General MacArthur's request, however, the President gave permission to use some ground units in Korea.⁸ Although Chiang Kai-shek offered the use of thirty-three thousand of his men, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that these men were poorly trained and equipped; furthermore, the transportation they would require could be used advantageously to carry supplies to the forces already in Korea. General MacArthur also advised against the use of troops from Formosa. "He suggested that he would himself go to Formosa and explain the situation to Chiang-Kai-shek."⁹

On July 8, 1950, General MacArthur was named the Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea and thus received an additional responsibility. At the start of the hostilities he was the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE). Under that title he commanded all units of the Armed Services in the Far East. Furthermore, he was the Commanding General, U. S. Army, Far East. As the administrator of Japan, his duties included many functions of the head of state.¹⁰

The first disagreement and the sign that Washington had put the Far East

⁴ Rovere, p. 128.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Introductory note.

⁷ John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur; Japan, Korea and the Far East* (New York, 1950), p. 193.

⁸ Rovere, pp. 96-97.

⁹ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol II: *Years of Trial and Hope* (New York, 1956), pp. 343-348.

¹⁰ Gunther, pp. 14-15.

near the bottom of "priorities" came when MacArthur requested reinforcements on July 7, 1950. He was turned down for the following reasons: "a) no increase in any part of the services had been authorized; b) a suitable United States military posture in other parts of the world had to be maintained; and c) there was a shortage of shipping."¹¹

The first serious dissension between Truman and the General arose over the American policy concerning Formosa. The President made a double reference to Formosa on June 27, 1950. He ordered, in substance, the United States' 7th Fleet into the Formosa waters to prevent an attack on Formosa by the Chinese Communists. He also requested the Nationalist Chinese government to stop any military action against the mainland of China.¹²

It was rather nervy of the President to dictate a course of action for the Nationalist government; for all its infirmities, it was still the government we recognized in China; but it seemed advisable to take some step that would reassure the world, and Asia especially, that our military intervention in Korea was being undertaken to check aggression, not to force Asia back on its distasteful past.¹³

General MacArthur did not agree with the administration's policy. On July 31, 1950, the General flew to Formosa to confer with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Although Washington and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed about the trip, and despite the clear statements that the trip was military and not political, the cry went out that the Generalissimo and MacArthur had been "... plotting some kind of international devilry at their meeting." The non-communist members of the UN were greatly disturbed by the news, and surprisingly enough, no attempt was made by Washington to answer the outright lies.¹⁴ President Truman said later about the General's visit to Formosa: "The implication was—and quite a few of our newspapers said so—that MacArthur rejected my policy of neutralizing Formosa and that he favored a more aggressive method. After Harriman explained the administration's policy to MacArthur, he had said that he would accept it as a good soldier. I was reassured. I told the press that the general and I saw eye to eye on Formosa policy."¹⁵

After the successful landing at Inchon, masterminded by MacArthur, the relationship between MacArthur and Washington seemed improved. In October of 1950, the President suggested a meeting with General MacArthur. The President apparently wanted to meet the General in person to make certain that the General would not embarrass the administration as he had done over Formosa and that he would not interfere in diplomatic affairs. The meeting was held on October 15, 1950, on Wake Island. The President and

¹¹ Courtney Whitney, Maj. Gen., *MacArthur—His Rendezvous with History* (New York, 1956), p. 337.

¹² Gunther, pp. 194-195.

¹³ Rovere, p. 125.

¹⁴ Whitney, pp. 371-374.

¹⁵ Truman, p. 354.

the General talked privately for an hour, then with their advisers present for two hours. After the meeting a communiqué was drawn up and initialed, as one reporter described it, by the President and the General "as if they were heads of different governments."¹⁶ Much speculation occurred later about why the conference was held. When the President was questioned about the meeting, he told reporters that the disagreement over Formosa had been settled before the meeting. "The General, in other words, was obeying orders."¹⁷ He also said later: "The general assured me that the victory was won in Korea. He also informed me that the Chinese Communists would not attack and that Japan was ready for a peace treaty."¹⁸ After the meeting the President awarded the General the Distinguished Service Medal (his fifth) and delivered a speech praising the General. Four years later, however, the President made the statement in Chicago that the only thing he repented was that he did not fire the General two years sooner.¹⁹ Major General Whitney, MacArthur's adviser, also questions the validity of the Wake Island conference and what was gained by it. As he states:

It was only later, when Mr. Truman made his amazing charge that MacArthur had misled him on the possibility of Red Chinese intervention and when the scandalous method of preparing the "record" of the proceedings was exposed, that MacArthur realized that Wake Island was no longer an enigma—it was a sly political ambush.²⁰

And further:

But what Truman personally—and the Democratic Party—gained by that trip in terms of plain political advantage was inestimable. By this one stroke the President was able to establish a connection between his administration and the military strategy against which most of his military advisers had argued but which had won the great victory at Inchon.²¹

After the Wake Island conference, there were no more policy statements from Tokyo and no more apologies from Washington. After Inchon everything seemed well, and after the fall of Pyongyang it was generally believed that the North Koreans would not be eager for a winter war. On the contrary, the resistance stiffened until the first hints of Chinese intervention came in October, 1950.²² The military mission of MacArthur was almost completed

¹⁶ Gunther, pp. 199-200.

¹⁷ Gunther, p. 201.

¹⁸ Truman, p. 365.

¹⁹ Whitney, pp. 389-390.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 395. Also, Major General Charles A. Willoughby has the following statement about the conference and the notes produced by General Bradley: The episode at Wake Island was later completely misinterpreted to the public and an effort made through an alleged eavesdropping report of a concealed State Department stenographer to pervert the position taken by General MacArthur. Major General Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, *MacArthur—1941-1951* (New York, 1954), p. 383.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 390-391.

²² Rovere, pp. 133-135.

after the fall of Pyongyang. The enemy had been decisively beaten on the battlefield. General MacArthur waited for the diplomatic action that would exploit the situation, but nothing was done by the State Department. He then decided to summon the North Korean commander to surrender. The summons was ignored. It was possible that the leaders of Red China were determining the possibilities of the United States entering Manchuria in case of Chinese intervention. General MacArthur was still puzzled over the inability—or refusal—of the State Department to strike a diplomatic blow, when he was denied the right to bomb the hydroelectric power plants along the Yalu. He was also denied the right to bomb an important supply center at Racin.²³ On October 26, 1950, the 8th Cavalry regiment encountered the first Chinese “volunteers.” The General realized that a possible trap was laid by the Chinese and ordered the Air Force to destroy the bridges across the Yalu.²⁴ The President immediately countermanded the General’s orders. “He was informed that there was a commitment not to take action affecting Manchuria without consultation with the British, and that until further orders all bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian border should be postponed.”²⁵ After vigorous protests from MacArthur the bombing of the Yalu bridges was permitted at the Korean end only. Thus Washington admitted openly that only half-measures were going to be used against the Chinese Communists, and the overwhelming disadvantages enforced upon the airmen caused many to ask: “On which side are Washington and Lake Success?” Because of the restrictions placed on the Air Force, the bridges could not be destroyed, and they still stand. When the Chinese intervened, the bridges played an important role.

As we know now, there followed twenty days during which the massive concentrations of Red Chinese did indeed tramp across these bridges—twenty days during which the near-disaster that followed could have been averted, twenty days in which, by a single decision in Washington, United States prestige in Asia was dragged from an all-time high to an all-time low . . . Indeed, the blood of many American and other Allied soldiers, sacrificed upon the altar of that infamous decision, gives evidence of the prophetic nature of MacArthur’s solemn warning in his reply of November 6: “. . . a calamity of major proportions for which I could not accept the responsibility.”²⁶

That the General sounded the alarm on November 6, 1950, came, according to the President, as a surprise. Only two days before, the Joint Chiefs had received a message from the General on the subject of Chinese intervention: “I recommend against hasty conclusions which might be premature

²³ Whitney, pp. 400-402.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 402-406.

²⁵ Truman, p. 375.

²⁶ Whitney, pp. 406-408.

and believe that a final appraisal should await a more complete accumulation of military facts.”²⁷ On the other hand, the President states that already on October 3, 1950, the State Department had received messages that the Chinese Communists were threatening to intervene in the Korean conflict. According to the messages, the action would not be taken if only South Korean troops would cross the 38th parallel.²⁸ In moving across the 38th parallel, the General was not violating the administration’s policy. The State and Defense Departments both agreed with the occupation of all Korea, the only reservation being that the last few miles below the Chinese and Russian borders be assigned to South Korean troops.²⁹ MacArthur had a disagreement with the Joint Chiefs about the last order. The General authorized the use of any troops anywhere.³⁰

On November 24, 1950, the General went ahead with his plan to mop up the remainder of North Koreans, which included some Chinese “volunteers.” This operation was risky because there were no intelligence reports from Washington, and air reconnaissance of Manchuria was impossible. Furthermore, the General could not safeguard his troops by knocking out the bridges across the Yalu. The drive started for two purposes: “1) if the Chinese were not coming into Korea, the drive would finish the Korean war; 2) if the Chinese were coming in, the U. N. troops were in far better position to cope with the unfathomable uncertainties that would follow . . .”³¹ There is a great deal to wonder about in the General’s behavior in late November of 1950. “He seems to have been overcome by an inexplicable euphoria. This was to some extent encouraged by developments at the front. The North Korean and Chinese resistance, which had stiffened in late October and early November, softened once again.”³² This was mistaken for something like a collapse. On November 26, 1950, MacArthur sent his last warning about the Chinese intervention to Washington. On the following day the Chinese entered the Korean conflict.³³ MacArthur had committed the additional military indiscretion of splitting his command. General Walton Walker, MacArthur’s commander in the field, had no command over the Tenth Corps on the right flank, commanded by General Ned Almond. When the Chinese struck, the divided front came apart, and much of the Tenth Corps had to be evacuated by sea.³⁴

The entrance of the Chinese Communists took Washington and Mac-

²⁷ Truman, p. 373.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 361-362.

²⁹ Rovere, p. 150.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

³¹ Whitney, pp. 414-416.

³² Rovere, p. 139.

³³ Whitney, p. 420.

³⁴ John Dille, *Substitute for Victory* (New York, 1954), p. 22.

Arthur by surprise. SCAP had virtually announced that the war was over. General MacArthur's optimistic views that the war would be over by Christmas were tragically wrong.³⁵ During the Korean conflict numerous requests for reinforcements were denied. After the Chinese intervened, General MacArthur recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the use of Chinese Nationalist forces to reinforce the hard pressed U. N. troops. The answer was that the recommendation was under consideration but would be delayed because it involved "worldwide consequences."³⁶ The Pentagon's messages after the Chinese intervention clearly showed confusion and contradiction. The Pentagon seemed to have the point of view that it would be nice if the U. N. forces could put up a successful resistance somewhere in Korea; but on the other hand, Korea was not a place to fight a major war. The General perceived two main thoughts in Washington after the retreat from the Yalu: "1) The administration had lost the 'will to win' in Korea. Washington was issuing directives to run, not for a counterattack. 2) The seeming intention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not only to give up without a hard fight but to attempt to evade the responsibility for this shameful decision."³⁷ President Truman, however, said later: ". . . I do blame General MacArthur for the manner in which he tried to excuse his failure. . . . Even before he started his ill-fated offensive of November 24, he still talked as if he had the answer to all the questions. But when it turned out that it was not so, he let all the world know that he would have won except for the fact that we would not let him have his way."³⁸ After the retreat from the Yalu, General Ridgway became MacArthur's ground commander in Korea. He rallied the U. N. forces, and the Chinese offensive came to a stop. The new deadlock policies of the United States did not appeal to the General and on March 7, 1951, he dictated to reporters another challenge to American and U. N. diplomacy.³⁹ "The real case against MacArthur in October and November was not that he provoked Chinese aggression but that he failed to prepare for it. That case was overwhelming." More than two weeks after his warnings that he faced a new army, he challenged that army with an inferior number of troops.⁴⁰

The final dissensions between the President and MacArthur came in rapid succession. Another explosion came when MacArthur made a statement about Formosa to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Apparently the White House had not been informed and the President asked the General to withdraw the statement. It appeared in the newspapers, however.⁴¹

³⁵ Gunther, p. 219.

³⁶ Whitney, pp. 422-423.

³⁷ Whitney, pp. 430-431.

³⁸ Truman, pp. 382-384.

³⁹ Rovere, pp. 157-166.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁴¹ Gunther, pp. 197-198.

"Truman had explained his Formosa decision by saying: 'The occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.'" MacArthur decided that with the message to the VFW he could place himself squarely behind the President, and he had composed a message that supported the President's statement.⁴² Major General Whitney explains the difficulties that arose with the publication of MacArthur's message to the VFW:

But in retrospect he [MacArthur] has always felt, and the conclusion certainly seems logical, that his statement innocently ran afoul of plans being hatched in the State Department to succumb to British pressure and desert the Nationalist government on Formosa. Under ordinary circumstances MacArthur's statement would cause no international difficulties because it echoed and explained an already announced U. S. policy. But in the event that the State Department was conspiring with the British to hand over Formosa to the Communists, it is easy to see how the statement to the VFW would cause consternation.⁴³

The final dissension came when Rep. Joseph W. Martin Jr., of Massachusetts, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, communicated to the General his belief that it was madness not to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. The General replied, and his letter was read on the floor of the House. The letter did not agree with the views of the administration.⁴⁴ President Truman was outraged. He said later: "The time had come to draw the line. MacArthur's letter to Congressman Martin showed that the General was not only in disagreement with the policy of the government but was challenging this policy in open insubordination to his Commander in Chief."⁴⁵

At 1 a.m. on April 11, 1951, the President of the United States summoned reporters for a special announcement. The reporters were handed three announcements. The first read:

With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.

⁴² Whitney, p. 377.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

⁴⁴ Rovere, p. 17.

⁴⁵ Truman, p. 447.

Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, the consideration is particularly compelling.

General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation offers him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in this case.⁴⁶

The second statement was addressed to the General and ordered him to turn his commands over to General Ridgway. The third was a formal notification to General Ridgway of his increased responsibilities. The exchange of views by the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and Mr. Harriman, the President's special adviser, are unrevealed. They all felt, however, that the action had to be taken. The midnight announcement was not originally planned, but it was decided, according to General Marshall, since indications were present that the action had become publicly known, to accelerate the transmission of the notification of dismissal by twenty hours. The procedure of dismissal did not leave MacArthur time for a farewell address to his troops nor for the customary ceremonies of turning his command over to General Ridgway. As of the moment he received the notice of dismissal, he was a general without a command.⁴⁷

The public was much aroused by the dismissal of the General. The White House received 27,363 letters and telegrams in the twelve days after the dismissal. It did not matter to the public that by law the President of the United States is entitled to the loyal service of his commanders and that the American citizen was sympathetic with the President's policy. The citizen was undoubtedly on General MacArthur's side.⁴⁸

The political parties were active also. The fact that a Democratic President had fired a Republican General put more fuel into the fire. The Republicans planned to have General MacArthur speak in the Capitol. The Democrats did not resist the plan. In fact, they joined with the Republicans in sponsoring the invitation. The Democrats, however, voiced the wish the world would "regard the occasion as less a function of state than a voluntary gathering—a kind of lecture, as it were, at which attendance was purely a matter of individual choice."⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Truman, p. 449.

⁴⁷ Rovere, pp. 171-175.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-8.

⁴⁹ Rovere, pp. 177-178.

On April 19, 1951, General MacArthur addressed the Joint Meeting of Congress in the Capitol. He again criticized the government's policy in Korea:

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision, from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I say, it proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete and our objectives within easy reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against North Korean invaders, a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.

Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary, first, the intensification of our economic blockade against China; second, the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; third, removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; fourth, removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that, if not permitted to destroy the enemy-built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.⁵⁰

With these words the General made clear his stand on the Korea issue and that he felt that the responsibility for the conduct of the war was entirely the government's.

The Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees' hearings were again a cause for hot dispute between the Democrats and the Republicans. The Republicans were for a special committee with equal representa-

⁵⁰ MacArthur's speech to Congress on April 19, 1951, as cited in Rovere, pp. 273-274.

tion, the Democrats were for using the standing committee on Military Affairs and Foreign Relations. The Republicans also wanted the hearings open, broadcast, newsreeled and televised; the Democrats wished them closed. Finally a compromise was reached. The hearings could be attended by all the members of the Senate but questioning was to be limited to committee members. No correspondents were allowed, and the hearings were not broadcast or televised. The Defense Department gave out press releases of the proceedings and, contrary to popular belief, the reporting was very accurate and thorough.⁵¹ The hearings began on Thursday morning May 3, 1951. The first matter to be explored was the differences between the Joint Chiefs and the General. The Joint Chiefs agreed that the differences ran deep. The General did not agree. He agreed, however, that he and the President and Secretary Acheson were in profound disagreement. The General pointed out that the differences between the President and himself were not differences of policy. The differences were between a man with a policy and a man without one. As MacArthur said about the policy of the administration: "There is no policy! There is nothing, I tell you, no plan, no anything." The General also stated that for these reasons his recall was invalid. He mentioned that no man can fail to support a policy that does not exist.⁵² The public was generally struck by MacArthur's assertion that he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in complete agreement on Korea, so a great deal of testimony was taken on that matter. The result was that MacArthur was in error, on the record anyway. The argument between the General and the Joint Chiefs was not really fundamental, although it was important. The case of the President against the General would have been the same even if the General had been in agreement with the Joint Chiefs.⁵³

At the hearings the American generals debated much on the matter of public policy as well as political matters. The hearings, no doubt, gave valuable information to the Politburo and the Red Army General Staff. For five cents a day the Russians were able to buy information, like the text of the Wake Island conference, for which they would have paid large sums a few weeks before. The Russians learned what they wanted about us and what we did and did not know about them. "Before God," Senator Tobey of New Hampshire was heard to say, "the picture makes me stand aghast."⁵⁴

General MacArthur again questioned the reasons for his relief in a speech in Boston on July 25, 1951:

I hesitate to refer to my own relief from the Far Eastern Commands as I have never questioned the legal authority underlying such action. But the three sole reasons publicly stated by the highest

⁵¹ Rovere, pp. 178-179.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 187-188.

⁵³ Rovere, p. 190.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

authority clearly demonstrates the arbitrary nature of the decision.

The first reason given was that, contrary to existing policy, I warned of the strategic relationship of Formosa to American security and the dangers inherent in this area's falling under Communist control. Yet this viewpoint has since been declared by the Secretary of State, under oath before Congressional committees, to have been and to be the invincible and long standing policy of the United States.

The second reason given was that I communicated my readiness to meet the enemy commander at any time to discuss acceptable terms of a cease-fire agreement. Yet, for this proposal, I was relieved of my command by the same authorities who since have received so enthusiastically the identical proposal when made by the Soviet Government.

The third and final reason advanced was my replying to a Congressman's request for information on a public subject then under open consideration by the Congress. Yet both Houses of Congress promptly passed a law confirming my action, which indeed had been entirely in accordance with a long existing and well recognized though unwritten policy.

This law states that no member of the Armed Forces shall be restricted or prevented from communicating directly or indirectly with any member or members of Congress concerning any subject unless such communication is in violation of law or the security and safety of the United States. And this formal enactment of basic public policy was approved without the slightest dissent by the President.⁵⁵

In conclusion we find that the dissensions between the General and the State Department go back before the Korean conflict. In 1945, Dean Acheson, then acting Secretary of State, said that the Japanese occupation authorities, including General MacArthur, were not the architects, but merely "the instruments" of policy. The General probably never forgave Acheson for the attempt to control him.⁵⁶ There were other personal misunderstandings between the General and the persons close to the President. The General has always had the tendency to be overoptimistic and subject to wishful thinking. Although he has many positive characteristics, his dominating characteristic no doubt, next to his courage, is his ego. "MacArthur is a Caesar, and not, let us say, a man overwhelmingly beloved like Gandhi."⁵⁷

It is quite clear that MacArthur believed that he was backed by a strong American policy when the United States entered the Korean conflict. He found out that his views were not shared by the administration.

It seems clear that when President Truman, Secretaries Acheson and Johnson, and General Bradley met in the White House office and decided to go into the war, their intention at the outset was not to use American lives as pawns in lengthy bargaining sessions with

⁵⁵ Address by General MacArthur before the Massachusetts Legislature in Boston, as cited in Rovere, pp. 315-316.

⁵⁶ Rovere, p. 120.

⁵⁷ Gunther, pp. 23-25.

the leaders of Asian Communism. I cannot believe—and neither can MacArthur—that these men plotted among themselves to kill 31,000 United States soldiers and spend 22 billion dollars only to ruin American prestige all over Asia. But this was the actual result of the policies they adopted. Somehow their aims got twisted.⁵⁸

We can understand some of the differences between the Joint Chiefs and the General. For the Joint Chiefs Korea was “just one engagement, just one phase” of a continuing battle; for General MacArthur it was the pay-off.⁵⁹ We cannot understand, however, why MacArthur walked into the Communist trap at the Yalu. Maybe he was emboldened by his belief that “it is the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute, and dynamic leadership.” He may have thought that the danger of defeat increased if he hesitated.⁶⁰

In general, the war in Korea resembled the war in Greece from 1946 to 1949. The terrorists in Greece also had a privileged sanctuary, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. General VanFleet fought in Greece, as he later did in Korea, with one hand tied behind his back. If MacArthur had fought in Greece, he probably would have protested about the limitations. The strategy of the Berlin airlift was successful, as was the fighting in Greece, for the theory of a limited war.⁶¹ This was the administration's biggest argument. As President Truman said: “The kind of victory MacArthur had in mind—victory by the bombing of Chinese cities, victory by expanding the conflict to all of China—would have been the wrong kind of victory.”⁶² It is, therefore, quite clear that the General's Korean policy seemed fatal to the purposes of American policy. The President, therefore, was naturally justified in relieving the General. However, one does wonder if the American policy in Korea was the right one. My personal views about the administration's policies in Asia would be tinted, no doubt, by prejudice. Having served in Korea with the 1st Marine Division, although not under the command of General MacArthur, I would have been in favor of a clear-cut decision in Korea. Since the Korean conflict was also “my war,” I was not aware of other happenings in the world.

The President raised many questions about MacArthur's judgment on the possibilities of Chinese intervention, and he said that the General had misled him with his Wake Island statement. I wonder why General Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did not repudiate MacArthur's statement? It is also a fact that the possibility of Chinese intervention was pointed out to the administration many times. It was also said that the Chinese intervened because they knew that MacArthur had orders not to retaliate. “Someone must have told them that even if the Red Chinese swarmed across the Yalu

⁵⁸ Whitney, p. 368.

⁵⁹ Rovere, p. 244.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁶² Truman, p. 446.

into North Korea in overwhelming hordes . . . the U. S. government would meekly submit to maintaining the same sanctuary in Manchuria, long after any possible reason for it existed."⁶³ This statement was substantiated by General VanFleet and General Almond at the Senate Internal Subcommittee hearings in 1954.⁶⁴

"One of the things the Indo-Chinese crises is doing is to vindicate the judgment of General Douglas MacArthur," the Alsops wrote in their syndicated column of June 13, 1954. "The free world would not now be menaced with a catastrophe in Asia if MacArthur had won his fight against the artificial limits of the Korean War."⁶⁵

Charles J. V. Murphy, the noted military analyst, has just summed up in *Fortune* the current strategic thinking within the Pentagon. "Long reflection," he says, "has persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Radford's regime that the Korean War should have been fought to a real decision, that the war which General Omar Bradley described as 'the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy' was in fact the best possible place to challenge communist power without the risk of a general war. China is still, and for some time will remain, critically dependent upon the Soviet Union for its major weapons."⁶⁶

The dismissal of General MacArthur by the President was the result of many dissensions. Many of these were personal, between the General and the President's advisers. The dissensions concerning the policy were the only publicized reasons for the dismissal. The real reasons for the General's dismissal may very well be hidden behind the dark cloak of secrecy that surrounds the papers and the actions of the former President of the United States, Harry S. Truman. In his memoirs, the former President gives the reason for the dismissal as "insubordination." It is strange indeed that the term "insubordination" was not used as the reason for the dismissal in the original text of the dismissal or at the Senate hearings. There is no doubt that the General's explosive character played an important part in starting the dissensions with the administration. The classic last verse of the Marine poem about General MacArthur clearly shows the characteristics of the General:

And while possibly a rumor now,
Some day it will be fact
That the Lord will hear a deep voice say,
Move over God, it's Mac.⁶⁷

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⁶³ Whitney, pp. 393-394.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 455-456.

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